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LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES ARE OFF AND RUNNING:
HISTORIC CHARLESTON HOLDINGS, LLC v. MALLON, ACCOUNTINGS, AND
DERIVATIVE ACTIONS IN LLC LITIGATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the General Assembly enacted the South Carolina Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act (SC ULLCA) in 1996,' no reported cases have interpreted
any of the Act's substantive provisions.2 Fortunately, or unfortunately, the time has
come for courts to interpret the SC ULLCA. The South Carolina business
community has embraced the limited liability company (LLC) form, and its
increasing application has finally brought a case that applies the statute. In Historic
Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon,3 the LLC's members disputed how assets
would be distributed, and one member claimed he was due reimbursements for
services provided to the LLC.4 The case was brought both directly and derivatively
on behalf of Dixie Holdings, and the court of appeals upheld the master-in-equity's
award of attorney's fees under the derivative statute.5 In its decision, the court of
appeals held the LLC's operating agreement and the SC ULLCA required an
accounting prior to distributing the company's assets.6 The court did not address the
SC ULLCA's derivative suit requirements in the closely held LLC context, but
allowed one member in a two-member LLC to sue derivatively on the company's
behalf.
This Note discusses two primary issues. First, whether the accounting remedy
is appropriate under these facts, and second, whether the plaintiff met the
requirements for a derivative action and if a derivative action is appropriate for a
closely held LLC. Part I, Section A describes the popularity of LLCs in South
Carolina. Part I, Section B stresses the importance of careful interpretation of the
SC ULLCA required by the popularity of LLCs. Part II presents the facts of Historic
Charleston Holdings and outlines the court of appeals' opinion. Part III, Sections
A and B conclude the court's order of an accounting action is not the appropriate
remedy because: (1) the amount in dispute is small and results from a single
1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-44-101 to -1208 (2006).
2. While no South Carolina cases have addressed substantive issues related to the LLC statute,
a recent case addressed punitive damages in an LLC breach of fiduciary duty action and made reference
to financial records issues similar to those analyzed here. See Jordan v. Holt, 362 S.C. 201, 206, 608
S.E.2d 129, 131 (2005). Interestingly, the LLC statute has been analyzed concerning the status of an
affiliate company in a Michigan bankruptcy case where the defendant was involved in a related South
Carolina proceeding. In re Barman, 237 B.R. 342, 348-49 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999).
3. 365 S.C. 524, 617 S.E.2d 388 (Ct. App. 2005), reh 'g denied, No. 4004, Shearouse Adv. Sh.
No. 34 at 5 (S.C. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2005),petition for cert. filed, No. 4004, Sherouse Adv. Sh. No. 42
at 9 (S.C. Nov. 7, 2005).
4. Id. at 531, 617 S.E.2d at 391.
5. Id. at 541, 617 S.E.2d at 394.
6. Id. at 535-36, 617 S.E.2d at 394.
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transaction; (2) the LLC has only two members disputing the amount; and (3) the
court supported the master's decision disallowing the member's requested
reimbursements, therefore the court only needed to divide the assets in half. Part III,
Section C argues an accounting was not required because the operating agreement
and the SC ULLCA do not require that procedure. Part IV concludes that awarding
attorney's fees under the derivative statute is not appropriate. Specifically, Part IV,
Section A explains that derivative actions are generally not effective for closely held
LLCs and Part IV, Section B shows the case did not meet the requirements for a
derivative action. Part V provides a conclusion.
A. Popularity of LLCs in South Carolina
The LLC form is extremely popular in South Carolina, with over 21,260
organizational filings in 2004.7 The number of LLCs filed with the Secretary of
State since 1994 has increased by an average of thirty-two percent annually.8 The
Secretary of State has reacted to the form's popularity by working with attorneys
and the General Assembly to eliminate bureaucratic hurdles to managing an LLC.9
The LLC's popularity results from its favorable tax treatment, flexible managerial
control, and offer of limited liability for LLC members."
While the state's economy has lagged in recent years, the General Assembly
has attempted to improve the business climate by increasing financing opportunities
and providing easier ways to do business in South Carolina. " The LLC form's lure
7. E-mail from Jody Steigerwalt, South Carolina Secretary of State's Office, to Carmen Harper
Thomas (Oct. 6, 2005, 16:05:19 EST) (on file with author).
8. Id. Exact figures, based on a June to May fiscal year and including both domestic and foreign
LLCs: 4 LLCs filed in 1993-94; 958 LLCs filed in 1994-95; 1,804 filed in 1995-96; 3,121 filed in
1996-97; 3,960 filed in 1997-98; 6,036 filed in 1998-99; 6,974 filed in 1999-2000; 8,231 filed in 2000-
01; 9,526 filed in 2001-02; 12,343 filed in 2002-03; 16,464 filed in 2003-04; and 21,260 filed in 2004-
05. Id.
9. See SOUTH CAROLINA SECRETARY OF STATE, 2003-2004 ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (2004),
http://www.scsos.com (indicating that information submitted in the annual report was already available
in Secretary of State files and that the Secretary of State addressed customer needs by eliminating a
"bureaucratic burden"); see also Act of April 29, 2004, 2004 S.C. Acts 2018 (eliminating the
requirement for filing an annual report).
10. See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 287 (Del. 1999). The Delaware
Supreme Court stated:
The limited liability company ("LLC") is a relatively new entity that has emerged
in recent years as an attractive vehicle to facilitate business relationships and
transactions .... [I]t is designed to achieve what is seemingly a simple
concept-to permit persons or entities ("members") to join together in an
environment of private ordering to form and operate the enterprise under an LLC
agreement with tax benefits akin to a partnership and limited liability akin to the
corporate form.
Id.
11. See Act of June 3, 2005, 2005 S.C. Acts 1469 (creating tax incentives for companies using
South Carolina port facilities); Act of May 25, 2005, 2005 S.C. Acts 528 (expanding eligibility for the
corporate income tax moratorium to include smaller companies); Act of April 10, 2005, 2005 S.C. Acts
[Vol. 57: 441
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as a tax efficient, limited liability entity may be included in the list of business
environment enhancements. Beginning with Wyoming in 1977, all fifty states had
enacted LLC statutes by mid-1996. 2 States generally see the LLC form as a
necessary component of a competitive business environment, and businesses
support that view by increasingly employing the LLC form.
B. Importance of LLC Statute Interpretation
Because many businesses presently use or plan to use the LLC form and
because South Carolina's economic competitiveness depends on the form, courts
must consistently and clearly interpret the SC ULLCA. Attorneys who rely on
unclear and inconsistent judicial opinions may draft inefficient or incorrect
operating agreements. Parties may bring unnecessary legal actions based on a cause
of action that is not viable. For example, in Jordan v. Holt, the LLC did business
without an operating agreement, relying on the statute for governance.' 3 If the LLC
members had interacted with each other without violating their fiduciary duties, they
might have avoided their problems by executing a detailed operating agreement. 4
Another problem in not having a definitive interpretation of the SC ULLCA is
the possibility for LLC members to abuse weaknesses in the statute. Several states
face the dangers accompanying online LLC incorporation by non-United States
members, opening the door for fraud and secret dealings.' 5 Foreign LLCs can then
launder suspicious funds through the United States banking system, attracting
Justice Department investigations. 6 Wrongdoers might exploit potential
weaknesses in the SC ULLCA for similar criminal purposes.'7 For these reasons,
South Carolina courts' initial interpretations of the SC ULLCA must be clear and
1743 (expanding eligibility for Jobs Tax Credits and creating a Capital Access Program to support
financial institution loans to small businesses); Act of May 11,2004,2004 S.C. Acts 2078 (mandating
state agency review of actions that could impact small businesses).
12. Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J.
1459, 1460 (1998); see also Robert R. Keatinge, Partnerships, LLCs and Beyond: Business and Tax
Law Considerations in Structuring, Operating and Terminating Unincorporated Businesses in a New
Environment, in PARTNERSHIPS, LLCs, AND BEYOND A-27 (1996) (describing the "explosion" of LLCs
following favorable IRS rulings that paved the way for partnership treatment of unincorporated
associations possessing corporate limited liability).
13. Jordan v. Holt, 362 S.C. 201, 203, 608 S.E.2d 129, 130 (2005).
14. In Jordan, the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge's assessment of
punitive damages against two LLC members for committing "egregious conduct." Id. at 203, 608
S.E.2d at 131. However, an operating agreement might have addressed the management issues that led
to the lawsuit because only two of the five members actively participated in operating the business. See
id. at 203, 608 S.E.2d at 130.
15. Glenn R. Simpson, How Top Dutch Bank Plunged into World of Shadowy Money, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 30, 2005, at Al.
16. Id.
17. In South Carolina, LLC filing requires the name and address of managers and organizers, but
does not require the names of all members. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-203 (2006).
2006]
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consistent." Courts may have to go out of their way to achieve sufficient clarity, but
the resulting stability will be worthwhile for the companies, their members, the
courts, and the citizens of South Carolina.
II. HISTORIC CHARLESTON HOLDINGS, LLC v. MALLON
The case discussed in this Note raises issues specific to LLCs, whiqh may help
shape the way courts and attorneys deal with the popular business form. In Historic
Charleston Holdings, Dixie Holdings, LLC (Dixie Holdings) had two members at
the time of the action, Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC (HCH) and Gerard
Mallon. 9 Priestly Coker and his wife were the only members of HCH.2" The parties
entered into an operating agreement in June 1998.21 Mallon and HCH each held
fifty-percent interests in Dixie Holdings after buying a one-percent interest from a
third member who dissociated.22 The members organized Dixie Holdings to buy,
renovate, and sell historic properties in Charleston, with Mallon performing
construction services for the properties and Coker performing financial services.23
After Dixie Holdings sold two of the four properties it owned, Mallon disputed
the amount he received from the sales because "he believed he had not separately
been compensated for work performed in renovating those properties." 4 Mallon
requested financial information from Coker.25 Coker kept Dixie Holdings' funds in
a bank account with funds from another co-venture, Dixie Developers.26 Both Coker
and Mallon had signatory authority on the account.27 In December 1999, the parties
executed an amendment to their operating agreement which stated, "'The sales
proceeds can be held in an escrow account. OR [othen [sic] written accepted
offer]." 28 The agreement also "provided for an audit of Dixie Holdings" and for
arbitration "if the members could not resolve their differences."29 Coker gave
18. Cf Larry E. Ribstein, A Critique of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 25 STETSON
L. REv. 311,323-24 (1995) (arguing that interstate consistency of LLC statutes is undesirable for many
reasons, including reducing innovation, and that "the best rule will emerge from the collective wisdom
and experience of lawyers and legislatures in fifty states as lawyers and their clients learn from the
actual operation of LLCs").
19. Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 365 S.C. 524, 529,617 S.E.2d 388, 390 (Ct.
App. 2005).
20. Id. at 529, 617 S.E.2d at 390.
21. Id. at 529, 617 S.E.2d at 390.
22. Id. at 529-30 n.l, 617 S.E.2d at 390-91 n.1.
23. Id. at 529, 617 S.E.2dat 391.
24. Id. at 530, 617 S.E.2d at 391.
25. Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 365 S.C. 524,530, 617 S.E. 2d 388, 391 (Ct.
App. 2005); Final Brief of Appellant at 7, Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 365 S.C. 524,
530, 617 S.E. 2d 388 (Ct. App. 2005) (No. 2002-CP-I0-04-04149).
26. Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.C. at 529-30 nn.3 & 4, 617 S.E.2d at 391 nn.3 & 4.
27. Id. at 529-30 nn.3 & 4, 617 S.E.2d at 391, nn.3 & 4.
28. Id. at 530, 617 S.E.2d at 391 (brackets in original).
29. Id. at 530, 617 S.E.2d at 391.
[Vol. 57:441
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Mallon a "computer printout for 1999 but it did not include any details of checks
disbursed."3 In April 2000, Coker gave Mallon a box of financial records in
addition to the computer printout,3' but neither the printout nor the box of records
satisfied Mallon's desire for a "proper accounting." 2
Also in April 2000, Dixie Holdings sold a third property, 15 Felix Street, with
net proceeds of $41,845.30. 33 Mallon placed the net proceeds into a separate bank
account under the name Dixie Developers, "of which he had sole signatory
authority."34 Coker repeatedly requested "that Mallon place the funds in a proper
escrow account," but Mallon ignored Coker's request.35 "Dixie Holdings' fourth
and final property was sold in December 2001 and the proceeds were split equally.
Thus, Dixie Holdings no longer own[ed] any property."36 HCH brought suit
"individually and in a derivative capacity as a member of Dixie
Holdings... against Mallon, Dixie Holdings, and Dixie Developers on October 11,
2002." 37
HCH alleged five causes of action in its complaint:
(1) a judicial decree winding up and dissolving Dixie Holdings;
(2) a full and complete accounting of Dixie Holdings including
transfers between it and Dixie Developers and Mallon; (3)
injunctive relief reversing Mallon's diversion of funds and
restraining Mallon from taking any action that would damage
either HCH or Dixie Holdings' interests; (4) a declaratory
judgment regarding each member's rights pursuant to section 15-
53-10 of the South Carolina Code; and (5) attorney's fees
pursuant to section 33-44-1104 of the South Carolina Code.38
Mallon answered by asserting a right to an accounting and claiming "entitlement to
reimbursement for services he performed on various properties of Dixie Holdings
that exceeded the proceeds Dixie Holdings received from the sale of 15 Felix
Street.
39
At trial before the master-in-equity, to support his request for reimbursement,
"Mallon presented a statement of charges in which he claimed he was owed $9,280
for work performed on four Felix Street properties, including $1,900 for work
30. Final Brief of Appellant, supra note 25, at 7.
31. Id.
32. Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.C. at 531, 617 S.E.2d at 392.
33. Id. at 530, 617 S.E.2d at 391.
34. Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 365 S.C. 524, 530-31 n.4, 617 S.E.2d 388,
391 n.4 (Ct. App. 2005).
35. Id. at 530-31, 617 S.E.2d at 391.
36. Id. at 531 n.6, 617 S.E.2d at 391 n.6.
37. Id. at 531, 617 S.E.2d at 391.
38. Id. at 531, 617 S.E.2d at 391-92.
39. Id. at 531, 617 S.E.2d at 392.
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performed on 15 Felix Street. In his order, the master denied Mallon's request for
an accounting" and his request for the $9,280 for reimbursed expenses.4' "The
master found HCH was entitled to receive one-half of the proceeds from the sale of
15 Felix Street, plus prejudgment interest on its half of the proceeds at the rate of
8.75% from the closing date of 15 Felix Street until the entry of judgment," and
"awarded HCH attorney's fees and costs" based on the derivative action statutory
requirements, which Mallon appealed.4 "The master also authorized HCH to
deliver articles of termination" to the Secretary of State.42
The court of appeals reversed the master's decision to deny an accounting and
remanded to have "a formal accounting" conducted.43 The court held both the
operating agreement and the SC ULLCA required an accounting prior to
dissolution." The court also ordered the proceeds from 15 Felix Street be held in
escrow and distributed after the accounting, reversing the master's order giving half
the proceeds to HCH.4' The court upheld the master's award of attorney's fees to
HCH, determining the master did not abuse his discretion in awarding fees." The
court also held most of Mallon's arguments against the attorney fees were not
preserved for review, including Mallon's argument that the suit was not a derivative
47action.
4
III. WAS AN ACCOUNTING NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE TO RESOLVE THE
DISPUTE?
While the court of appeals decided "an accounting was necessary for the
dissolution and winding up of Dixie Holdings' business, ' 4 several factors,
including the operating agreement's requirements and the size and financial status
of Dixie Holdings, indicate an accounting may not have been necessary or
appropriate. The equitable accounting remedy is "[a]n equitable proceeding for a
complete settlement of all partnership affairs, usually in connection with partner
misconduct or with a winding up."'49 An accounting is the "primary method through
which partners resolve disputes among themselves."' In Historic Charleston
40. Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 365 S.C. 524, 532, 617 S.E.2d 388, 392 (Ct.
App. 2005).
41. Id. at 532, 617 S.E.2d at 392.
42. Id. at 531,617 S.E.2d at 392.
43. Id. at 537, 617 S.E.2d at 395.
44. Id. at 536, 617 S.E.2d at 394.
45. Id. at 538, 617 S.E.2d at 395.
46. Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 365 S.C. 524, 540-41, 617 S.E.2d 388, 397
(Ct. App. 2005).
47. Id. at 540, 617 S.E.2d at 396.
48. Id. at 536, 617 S.E.2d at 394.
49. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 21 (8th ed. 2004).
50. JAMES R. BURKHARD, PARTNERSHIP AND LLC LITIGATION MANUAL: ACTIONS FOR
ACCOUNTING AND OTHER REMEDIES § 1.01, at 1 (1995).
[Vol. 57: 441
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Holdings, both parties requested an accounting at trial.5' Coker argued against the
accounting on appeal because he received half of the disputed sum plus significant
fees and interest under the master's ruling.52 Mallon wanted an accounting because
the procedure could determine the LLC should have reimbursed him for his work
on Dixie Holdings' properties,53 although the court of appeals stated "[t]he master's
findings that Mallon was not entitled to set off' would make the accounting on
remand easier. 4
The parties required assistance to settle their -dispute because they were at an
impasse over how to distribute Dixie Holdings' funds. For reasons related to the
business's size and the amount in dispute, an accounting is a disproportionate
remedy compared to the court simply resolving the case on appeal by entering a
decision allocating the disputed amount. While not undertaking an accounting to
settle internal business disputes may be the exception,55 when the assets are
uncomplicated and there are few members, an accounting may be inappropriate.
First, meeting the statute's minimum record-keeping requirement56 would have
adequately allowed Coker and Mallon to determine Dixie Holdings' profits, losses,
and their individual shares on dissociation. Second, the amount in dispute was small
and determinable, as evidenced by the master's ruling on Mallon's claim for
reimbursement. Third, with only two members, an accounting procedure to
determine rights between two people is inefficient when the dispute could have
been resolved either by the audit agreed to by the parties prior to the action57 or
through an entry of judgment by the court of appeals. Finally, discrepancies
between the operating agreement and the statutory requirements show an accounting
was not the required remedy. 8
A. Effect ofLLC Recordkeeping on Financial Issues
First, the SC ULLCA requires the LLC to furnish records "concerning the
company's business or affairs."59 The comment to this section elaborates that
although the statute does not require records, "a company should maintain records
necessary to enable members to determine their share of profits and losses and their
rights on dissociation."60 Presumably, if the LLC maintains proper records,
51. Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.C. at 531, 617 S.E.2d at 391-92.
52. Id. at 532, 617 S.E.2d at 392.
53. Id. at 532, 617 S.E.2d at 392.
54. Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon 365 S.C. 524, 537, 617 S.E.2d 388, 395 (Ct.
App. 2005).
55. BuRKHARD, supra note 50, § 1.02, at 3 (citing Dunn v. Zimmerman, 631 N.E.2d 1040,1044
(Ohio 1994)).
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-408 (2006).
57. Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.C. at 530, 617 S.E.2d at 391.
58. Id. at 536, 617 S.E.2d at 394.
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-408 (2006).
60. Id. § 33-44-408 cmt.
2006]
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members should be able to determine what they are due upon dissolution.6'
Maintaining financial records is helpful to the LLC62 in avoiding the problems that
occurred with Dixie Holdings. Mallon argued Coker did not properly maintain
records because Coker only gave Mallon a box of incomplete records." Mallon and
the former member requested "a full set of financial records" from Coker.'
However, if the only financial records available were bank statements that Mallon
had full access to as the joint signatory on the account, 5 the records available to
Coker were the same records available to Mallon. The additional information
necessary for Mallon to be reimbursed for his expenses were receipts likely in
Mallon's possession, not the LLC's.6 6 If Mallon could not produce the receipts at
the first trial with the master, he would likely not have them for the subsequent
accounting unless he gave the receipts to Coker; if he gave the receipts to Coker,
Coker could not argue that Mallon was not entitled to reimbursement. Additionally,
the master's denial of expenses to Mallon was not based on the incomplete records,
but "because the parties had a 'course of dealing of determining expenses prior to
property sales and paying authorized expenses from the sale proceeds.'
67
Therefore, if the expense records were not at issue, the bank statements would be
the only records necessary to determine the account balances. While having
accurate LLC records available from the outset may have avoided the dispute, the
available records should have been sufficient to determine the financial status of
Dixie Holdings without requiring an accounting.
61. Although it appears the LLC members did not maintain these records, bank records could
have been adequate because no evidence of complicated dealings existed. However, the bank records
may also have been a problem as Mallon alleged "the bank has been sold several times and.., has not
been able to provide usable records." Final Brief of Appellant, supra note 25, at 17.
62. See Ann Maxey, West Virginia's Limited Liability Company Act: Problems with the Act, 96
W. VA. L. REv. 905, 947 n.135 (1994). In comparing Virginia's recordkeeping requirement to West
Virginia's, Maxey stated, "The requirement to keep information and records can be helpful to the
members. Courts, however, in deciding to pierce the limited liability veil of LLCs, may use the failure
to keep these records in the same way courts point to the failure of a corporation to maintain its formal
records." Id. Thus, LLCs have a strong incentive to maintain adequate records.
63. Final Brief of Appellant, supra note 25, at 7.
64. Id. The appellant's brief also mentioned the box of records Coker gave Mallon and specified
that "it did not include any cancelled checks," which would have been no more detailed as to the
account transactions than the records available directly from the bank. See id.
65. Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 365 S.C. 524, 530-31 n.4, 617 S.E.2d 388,
391 n.4 (Ct. App. 2005).
66. Mallon listed $9,280 in ekpenses at trial, including specific items for each property like
"Porch removal to avoid collapse $550" and "Clean up $800." Final Brief of Appellant, supra note 25,
at 6. However, Coker claimed to have never received "invoices, cancelled checks, or other
documentation" to support Mallon's claimed expenses. Brief of Respondent at 16, Historic Charleston
Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 365 S.C. 524, 617 S.E.2d 388 (Ct. App. 2005) (No. 2002-CP-10-04149).
67. Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.E.2d at 532, 617 S.E.2d at 392.
[Vol. 57:441
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B. Small Amount of Money and Few Members Should Make Unraveling
Simple
The second and third reasons against an accounting remedy in the case are that
the $41,845.30 in dispute68 was too small to warrant an accounting procedure, and
that the dispute involved only two members, making an accounting unnecessary to
divide money in half. An accounting is appropriate when the accounts are
complicated or mutual.69 A mutual account is "an open account where there are
items debited and credited on both sides of the account," as in a buyer-seller
relationship where the parties' transactions are set off.7" The shared account at issue
in Historic Charleston Holdings involved only the transactions for Dixie Holdings.
An accounting would not be necessary even when "there are several items in the
account, or because of the necessity for considering numerous transactions, or for
the examination of books and records."'"
According to the court, only one transaction was in dispute-the distribution
of proceeds from the sale of 15 Felix Street.72 The court made conflicting statements
regarding whether Mallon was entitled to reimbursement. First, the court referenced
the master's denial of expenses, which established the basis for the expense issue
on appeal.7 3 Second, in describing why an accounting is necessary, the court
referenced the operating agreement's requirement that "the company 'shall
reimburse Members for all authorized, direct out-of-pocket expenses incurred on
behalf of the Company."' 74 While that reference conflicts with the master's holding
denying Mallon reimbursement, the reference is not conclusive of Mallon's
eligibility for reimbursement on appeal. Another statement by the court of appeals
that conflicts with the master's denial of expenses is its holding that the "master
must first conduct an accounting to determine the balance of Dixie Holdings' assets
after the payment of liabilities, which presumably under the operating agreement
includes reimbursements to members."75 The court alluded to the possibility that
Mallon may be entitled to reimbursement for certain expenses. However, the court
returned to the idea that Mallon will not be reimbursed when it stated, "[t]he
master's findings that Mallon was not entitled to setoff and the fact that Dixie
Holdings' only remaining asset was the disputed amount will only serve to make
68. Id. at 530, 617 S.E.2d at 391.
69. 1 AM. JUR. 2D Accounts and Accounting § 56 (2005).
70. Id. § 6.
71. Id. § 57.
72. Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.C. at 533 n.7, 617 S.E.2d at 393 n.7. Although Mallon
wanted reimbursement from all four properties, the master "limit[ed] the scope of the underlying action
to the 15 Felix Street property," and the court of appeals decided Mallon did not present adequate
support for his argument against limiting the action's scope. Id. at 533 n.7, 617 S.E.2d at 393 n.7.
73. Id. at 532, 617 S.E.2d at 392.
74. Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 365 S.C. 524, 537, 617 S.E.2d 388, 395 (Ct.
App. 2005).
75. Id. at 536, 617 S.E.2d at 394 (emphasis added).
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[the accounting] easier."76 Finally, the court recognized the issue of Mallon's
expenses was not preserved for appellate review, further lending support to the
master's holding that recovery for expenses was not appropriate." Judging by the
court's statements, how to split the remaining $41,845.30 seemed to be the only
issue related to the LLC's financial status that the court needed to resolve-not
whether, or how, to account for Mallon's expenses. By returning the case to the
master for an accounting, the court of appeals must have intended the master to do
something additional on remand. However, the court of appeals' statements
regarding Mallon's expenses indicate the only remaining task on remand was to
divide the $41,845.30. The court unfortunately left many questions unanswered,
particularly what, if any, additional action the master should take on remand.
As to the small number of members, courts have held that "one partner cannot
maintain an action against his copartner for an accounting as to particular items or
transactions."" The 15 Felix Street transaction in Historic Charleston Holdings was
the sole issue to be accounted. While a party may allege an individual transaction
was improper, a court cannot account for only one transaction because an
accounting "should be a complete adjustment of the partnership accounts, 79 which
is impossible when only one transaction is in dispute. In addition, the operating
agreement in Historic Charleston Holdings provided a simple method for dividing
the LLC's assets between two members. According to the operating agreement, the
assets were to be distributed "[t]o each Member in accordance with their respective
Membership Percentages.""0 HCH had only two members whose membership
percentages were equal. Thus, the assets should have been divided equally among
the members. Because the amount at issue was ascertainable and only needed to be
split in half, an accounting was unnecessary.
76. Id. at 537, 617 S.E.2d at 395.
77. Id. at 538 & n.9, 617 S.E.2d at 395 & n.9 ("Mallon raises several other issues on appeal,
including whether the circuit court erred in. (1) disallowing Mallon's charges for the Felix Street
properties; (2) disallowing the charges involved with the Dixie Developers properties .... The
arguments in support of these issues.., either were not raised below or were presented in Mallon's
brief in a conclusory manner without supporting authority. Thus, these issues each have procedural
problems that foreclose appellate review and we decline to address them." (citations omitted)).
78. Hildebrand v. Topping, 608 N.E.2d 119, 123 (III. App. Ct. 1992).
79. Williams v. Henkle, 201 fI1. App. 362,370 (111. App. Ct. 1916); see also Stuckey v. Douglas,
401 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Ark. 1966) ("[T]he object of the suit was to obtain a complete accounting of the
partnership affairs .... In such a situation the complaining partner is not entitled to require the
defendant to account for certain items only, without respect to the rest of the partnership business.");
Baird v. Baird's Heirs, 21 N.C. 407,419 (N.C. 1837) ("A partner cannot demand an account in respect
of particular items, and a division of particular parts of the property; but the account must necessarily
embrace everything .... ).
80. Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.C. at 535, 617 S.E.2d at 394.
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C. Differences in the Statute and the Operating Agreement Show an
Accounting Was Unnecessary
1. Statute Establishes the Court's Discretion
In addition to the apparent simplicity of the financial details involved in
Historic Charleston Holdings, the SC ULLCA gives courts discretion to fashion a
remedy short of an accounting."1 The SC ULLCA, like other LLC statutes,82 does
not give LLC members an express right to an accounting. In contrast, the
partnership statute provides a "right to a formal account as to partnership affairs."83
The Uniform Partnership Act references the term "account" more often than the SC
ULLCA.84 The SC ULLCA references "account" or "accounting" in two locations.
The words "account" or "accounting" are mentioned first in section 33-44-409,
stating that a member owes a duty of loyalty "to account to the company and to hold
as trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit derived by the member" from the
company's assets.85 The second mention is in section 33-44-410, stating that a
member can bring an action against an LLC or another member "for legal or
equitable relief, with or without an accounting as to the company's business, to
enforce... the member's rights."86 However, the "duty to 'account' only establishes
the duty; it does not statutorily require that the enforcement of this duty will be
through an equitable accounting proceeding. 87 Because the SC ULLCA does not
provide an explicit accounting requirement but explicitly gives courts discretion to
avoid accountings, the legislature likely intended to give LLCs more flexibility to
resolve disputes. Flexibility is particularly important when a small amount is in
dispute and there are only a few members in the LLC; a court should be able to
enter judgment and resolve the dispute without drawing out the process with
increased judicial and economic costs.
While a master may have the ability to perform an accounting, the circuit
court's order of reference can specifically limit the master's powers.88 Without
specific instructions, the master performs essentially the same function as the circuit
81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-410 (2006).
82. 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES § 10:4, at 10-17 (2d ed. 2004).
83. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-550 (2006). The partnership statute states:
Any partner shall have the right to a formal account as to partnership affairs: (1)
If he is wrongfully excluded from the partnership business or possession of its
property by his copartners; (2) If the right exists under the terms of any
agreement; (3) As provided by § 33-41-540 [fiduciary relationship to
partnership]; or (4) Whenever other circumstances render it just and reasonable.
84. Id. § 1.01, at 2 ("The word 'account' is found at six places in the Uniform Partnership Act.").
85. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-409 (2006).
86. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-410 (2006).
87. BURKHARD, supra note 50, § 5.05, at 102.
88. Rule 53(c), SCRCP.
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court.89 The Historic Charleston Holdings court relied heavily on the operating
agreement to define how the LLC was to act upon dissolution.9" The operating
agreement provided how funds were to be distributed upon dissolution and for the
reimbursement of members' expenses.91 The court only needed to follow the
agreement to distribute the funds. The master's involvement was not necessary on
remand. Because the operating agreement sufficiently described the rules for
distributing the LLC's assets and the business's finances were simple, the court did
not need to order an accounting to resolve the dispute.
2. Reliance on the Operating Agreement and Statute
The court of appeals incorrectly held the operating agreement and SC ULLCA
required an accounting. Discrepancies between the operating agreement, the statute,
and the court of appeals' holding show the dispute could have been resolved
without an accounting.
a. Conflict with the Operating Agreement's Requirements
Although the court held the operating agreement required an accounting, the
agreement did not require that result.92 According to the SC ULLCA, the LLC's
operating agreement can "regulate the affairs of the company and the conduct of its
business, and.., govern relations among the members, managers, and company." 93
The statute also states the LLC's operating agreement controls over the statute,
unless the operating agreement does not address the issue.94 The court stated,
"Operating agreements are binding contracts that are superior to statutory authority
where they are in place. However, to the extent that the operating agreement is
silent as to some matter, statutory law will apply."95 As stated above, the SC
ULLCA contains no explicit requirement for an accounting.96 Thus, the operating
agreement's most important provisions in the Historic Charleston Holdings context
are those describing how the company will dissolve and the role of an accounting
procedure in the dissolution.
89. See id.
90. Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 365 S.C. 524,534-36,617 S.E.2d 388,393-94
(Ct. App. 2005).
91. Id. at 535, 617 S.E.2d at 393-94.
92. Id. at 536, 617 S.E.2d at 394.
93. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-103(a) (2006).
94. Id. ("To the extent the operating agreement does not otherwise provide, this chapter governs
relations among the members, managers, and company.").
95. Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.C. at 534, 617 S.E.2d at 393 (citing S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 33-44-103 (Supp. 2004)).
96. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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First, the agreement in Historic Charleston Holdings provided for how the
LLC's assets were to be distributed upon dissolution.9" The court assumed the
operating agreement required an accounting prior to distributing the LLC's assets,
concluding "the master must first conduct an accounting to determine the balance
of Dixie Holdings' assets after the payment of liabilities, which presumably under
the operating agreement includes reimbursements to members."98 The operating
agreement required a determination of assets and liabilities before paying the LLC's
debts. Reimbursements to members, if necessary, should be included in the first step
of determining assets and liabilities. However, the court of appeals' conclusion that
an accounting procedure was the correct method to determine assets and liabilities
was an overreaching assumption. Moreover, the court of appeals addressed
Mallon's reimbursement eligibility which, though confusing, seemed to resolve the
issue by not allowing the reimbursement.99 Thus, the accounting procedure was
unnecessary because a court could determine the company's assets and liabilities,
as required by the operating agreement upon dissolution, without conducting an
accounting.
In addition to the operating agreement's distribution of assets, the court also
mentioned the operating agreement's requirement that "[e]ach of the Members shall
be furnished with a statement setting forth the assets and liabilities of the Company
as of the date of the complete liquidation.""l° ° The court interpreted that provision
as "contemplat[ing] a final accounting upon complete liquidation."'' The court
overemphasized the operating agreement's mandate for an accounting procedure
because there was no express requirement for such a process anywhere in the
operating agreement. While the operating agreement required a statement, the court
made an unnecessary inference that an accounting procedure was required to
provide the statement.
However, the timing of the statement the operating agreement required shows
that an accounting procedure would be ineffective. The operating agreement
provided for dissolution, followed by distributions to creditors, and then
distributions to members, but never required an accounting as part of the process of
97. The operating agreement stated:
In the event of a Termination Event and the Members do not elect to continue the
business of the Company, the assets of the Company shall be distributed in the
following order and priority: (a) To the payment of debts and liabilities of the
Company (other than the Capital Contributions of the Members) and expenses of
liquidation; (b) To the setting up any reserves . . .; and (c) To each Member in
accordance with their respective Membership Percentages.
Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.C. at 535, 617 S.E.2d at 393-94.
98. Id. at 536, 617 S.E.2d at 394.
99. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
100. Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 365 S.C. 524,535,617 S.E.2d 388,394 (Ct.
App. 2005).
101. Id. at 536, 617 S.E.2d at 394.
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distributing assets."' An LLC with adequate records could presumably dissolve
without a judicially ordered accounting. The operating agreement required the
statement of assets and liabilities to be provided at "complete liquidation," which
is, confusingly, after the assets have already been distributed.' °3 "'Liquidation' in
its general sense means the act or operation of winding up the affairs of a firm or
company, by getting in assets, settling with debtors and creditors, and appropriating
the amount of profit or loss."' ' Based on South Carolina law, the complete
liquidation referred to in the operating agreement meant completing the steps for
distributing assets to the LLC's creditors and members. Applying the court's
interpretation requiring an accounting to the agreement's use of the "complete
liquidation" language, the agreement would have required the accounting to be
conducted after the assets were distributed, including distribution of members'
shares. An accounting at that stage would not be helpful because all the assets
would have been distributed and all liabilities settled. While such a narrow
interpretation of the operating agreement's complete liquidation language may not
lead to an equitable result, the court's emphasis on the agreement's significance
must be balanced with the agreement's specific terms. The discrepancy caused by
the operating agreement's contradictory accounting and liquidation language
demonstrates the court of appeals relied too heavily on the accounting language in
interpreting the agreement.
Another point to note regarding the operating agreement's implied accounting
requirement is the exact meaning of how the court defined an accounting as
mandated by the operating agreement. The operating agreement simply required a
"statement setting forth the [LLC's] assets and liabilities."'0 5 The word "statement"
connotes a report or a basic iteration of the LLC's financial status. Having such a
statement would be a preferable result because the agreement's distribution method
was simple.w6 The court's requirement for a "formal accounting" connotes an
accounting procedure. The court remanded to the master for the accounting 0 7 and
the master must enter a judgment rather than simply provide a report,' which
requires the master to conduct a proceeding similar to a trial. The court's remand
102. Id. at 536, 617 S.E.2d at 399-94.
103. Id. at 535, 617 S.E.2d at 394.
104. Anderson v. Page, 212 S.C. 522, 529, 48 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1948) (interpreting liquidation
definition to distribute funds on liquidation of testator's business as specified in his bequest); see also
Henry v. Alexander, 186 S.C. 17, 22, 194 S.E. 649, 651 (1937) ("The term 'liquidation,' applied to a
partnership or a corporation, is the act or operation of winding up the affairs of such firm or company
by collecting the assets, settling with its debtors and creditors, and appropriating the amount of profit
or loss." (citation omitted)).
105. Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.C. at 535, 617 S.E.2d at 394.
106. See supra Part lII.B.
107. Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 365 S.C. 524, 537, 617 S.E.2d 388, 395 (Ct.
App. 2005).
108. Rule 53(b), SCRCP ("When a reference [of an action to the master by the circuit court or
clerk] is made, the master... shall enter final judgment as to the causes of action referred. A case shall
not be referred to a master... for the purpose of making a report to the circuit court.").
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implied that some further action was necessary-that the master has to do
something. Thus, the operating agreement seems to consider an accounting to be
a report while the court's opinion indicates that the accounting should be a
procedure. The difference in definitions between the operating agreement and the
court's holding provides another reason why the court overemphasized the
operating agreement's accounting language and mandated more judicial
involvement than was necessary to resolve the dispute.
b. Conflict with the SC ULLCA 's Requirements
The court also relied on the SC ULLCA as a second basis for requiring the
accounting, stating that "even assuming the operating agreement was silent as to
some aspect of winding up Dixie Holdings, we find an accounting was warranted
pursuant to statute."' 9 As noted above, the statute does not require an accounting
procedure upon dissolution."' The dissolution process in the statute is comparable
to the operating agreement in that the same steps are required, though not in the
same order because the operating agreement placed what the court interpreted as the
accounting after complete liquidation. In the statute the first step is dissolution,
followed by winding up'"- including distribution to creditors and then members
as required by South Carolina Code 33-44-806(a) 2-- and ultimately the LLC's
termination.' Of the two specific mentions of"account" and "accounting," neither
provides for an accounting procedure specifically upon winding up." 4 The court
recognized the distribution process for winding up specified in section 33-44-
806(a), but then made a broad statement that "[i]n most instances, including the
present case, this task can only be accomplished after an accounting."'" 5 The court
cited no supporting authority for this broad requirement of an accounting for any
dissolution. Assuming the court's statement applies only to judicial dissolutions,"
6
109. Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.C. at 536, 617 S.E.2d at 394.
110. See supra Part II.C.
11. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-801 (2006) ("A limited liability company is dissolved, and its
business must be wound up, upon the occurrence of any of the following events," and a list of events
that trigger dissolution follows); infra note 113.
112. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-806(a) (2006) (indicating that in winding up, subsection (a)
requires the LLC to first "discharge its obligations to creditors, including members who are creditors,"
and then requires "[a]ny surplus must be applied to pay in money the net amount distributable to
members").
113. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-805 (2006) (stating that "[a]t any time after dissolution and
winding up, a limited liability company may terminate its existence by filing" articles of termination).
114. See supra Part III.C.
115. Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 365 S.C. 524, 536,617 S.E.2d 388,394 (Ct.
App. 2005).
116. The court said that in winding up, "courts are required to detennine" how to distribute the
assets and discharge obligations, implying that the statement might be limited to judicial dissolutions
ordered pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-801(4) (2006). See Historic Charleston Holdings, 365
S.C. at 536, 617 S.E.2d at 394.
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the variety of reasons an LLC may be judicially dissolved do not always involve
circumstances when the financial records would be in disorder." 7 Therefore, other
than the court's preference, no mandatory basis exists for the court to determine that
an accounting was necessary in Historic Charleston Holdings.
c. The Court of Appeals'Holding
The court of appeals' opinion had discrepancies related to the accounting. The
court of appeals stated that an accounting must occur prior to dissolution." 8 The
court also stated that "under these circumstances an accounting was necessary for
the dissolution and winding up of Dixie Holdings' business.""..9 As explained
above, the court's broad holding requiring an accounting is not based firmly on
either the statute or the operating agreement. The court said winding up requires
an accounting "in most instances,"'"2 but the court also "recognize[d] the master
may grant relief to a member pursuant to section 33-44-410 without an accounting
of the limited liability company's business."'' A conflict exists between those
statements because the statute has explicitly established flexibility in designing a
remedy. However, the court imposed the idea that an accounting will usually be
required, taking away from the judge's discretion provided by the statute.
Another discrepancy is that the sequence of the court of appeals' process for
winding up does not comport with its analysis of the statute and operating
agreement. The court would have the accounting performed first, followed by
distributions to members and then to the LLC's members.'22 As explained above,
the operating agreement required the statement of assets and liabilities to be
provided after "complete liquidation." '23 However, the court interpreted "Dixie
Holdings' operating agreement [as] requir[ing] an accounting prior to
dissolution."' 24 A technical interpretation of the court's opinion places the court of
117. A court can order ajudicial dissolutions pursuant to S.C. CODEANN. § 33-44-801(4) (2006)
based on: (a) unreasonable frustration of the LLC's economic purpose; (b) another member's conduct
relating to the LLC's business making it impracticable "to carry on the company's business with that
member;" (c) impracticability of carrying on the company's business "in conformity with the articles
of organization and the operating agreement;" (d) failure to purchase a member's distributional interest
if required; or (e) actions by the controlling managers or members that are "unlawful, oppressive,
fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner." S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-801(4) (2006). None
of these reasons necessarily relate to the financial status of the LLC. However, reason (a) might require
a financial analysis by the court but not analysis by a third party through an accounting procedure.
118. Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.C. at 536, 617 S.E.2d at 394.
119. Id. at 535-36, 617 S.E.2d at 394.
120. Id. at 536, 617 S.E.2d at 394.
121. Id. at 535, 617 S.E.2d at 394.
122. Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 365 S.C. 524, 536, 617 S.E.2d 388, 394 (Ct.
App. 2005) ("[T1he master must first conduct an accounting to determine the balance of Dixie
Holdings' assets after the payment of liabilities." (emphasis added)).
123. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
124. Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.C. at 536, 617 S.E.2d at 394.
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appeals' accounting at the opposite end of the process from the operating
agreement. The statute does not explicitly order an accounting during any of the
steps,' 25 but an accounting procedure ordered in a judicial dissolution is most
appropriately held after the dissolution as part of winding up.
3. The Impact ofDifferences in Requirements
While the discrepancies among the operating agreement, statute, and the
master's and court of appeals' holdings may seem minor because the financial result
could be identical whether the accounting was done prior to or after dissolution, the
order of the process is important for several reasons. First, an LLC member can still
bind the LLC after dissolution if the party with whom the member dealt did not
know the LLC was dissolved or if the member's action was taken as part of
winding up the LLC 26 Second, a member's fiduciary duty continues after
dissolution and during winding up.127 Assuming all business halts immediately
upon dissolution, there is potentially less likelihood for a change in the LLC's
financial status. However, assuming business would not be conducted during the
winding up is not realistic.
Instead of ordering the accounting, the court could have allocated the assets
with the financial information that was already before it. The court had discretion
to order relief "with or without an accounting as to the company's business. ' 28
Because the court determined the LLC should not reimburse Mallon, and the
operating agreement specified the method of distribution on dissolution, the court
could have ordered the amount split between the two parties. A judge could have
conducted a hearing to resolve the dispute instead of referring the matter to a master
for an accounting.'29 Once the matter has been referred to the master, he proceeds
with "all power and authority which a circuit judge sitting without a jury would
have in a similar matter,"13 collecting evidence such as "contracts, receipts, [and]
profit-and-loss statements," and potentially calling witnesses. ' Neither the court
of appeals nor the master needed evidence other than Mallon's receipts for his
expenses. If Mallon's receipts were unavailable, an educated estimate of the
amount he should have spent would still have been possible, although the master
would likely have had to appoint a third-party accountant to develop the figure, as
125. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
126. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-804 (2006).
127. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 82, § 11:9, at 11-25 to -26 (explaining that
"[m]embers' and managers' fiduciary duties continue through winding up" so that "managers may not
engage in gross negligence, self-dealing, or other acts that would have been regarded as fiduciary
breaches prior to dissolution").
128. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-410 (2006); see supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
129. BURKHARD, supra note 50, § 7.05(a), at 166 (citing Beck v. Clarkson, 300 S.C. 293,
304-05, 387 S.E.2d 681, 687-88 (Ct. App. 1989)).
130. Rule 53(c), SCRCP.
131. BURKHARD, supra note 50, § 7.05(c), at 174.
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the master did in Halbersberg v. Berry, where the records did not show the
necessary valuation of materials to calculate profits and losses.'32 For the master to
extend the accounting procedure to involve a third party in a case like this-where
the amount is related to a single transaction affecting only two parties-would be
inefficient. When information is available, the court promotes judicial efficiency
by deciding a case without additional unnecessary procedure.
Because the LLC form allows certain freedoms to members and can therefore
encourage entrepreneurial growth, the members must be held accountable for the
terms of their agreement. If the operating agreement is to be held in such high
regard by the court, the members must recognize its importance when organizing
the LLC. Indeed, the preface material to the SC ULLCA notes that "sophisticated
parties will negotiate their own deal."'33 With freedom comes responsibility. If
businesses are encouraged to develop in the LLC form, they must know how to
correctly maneuver the LLC form and the SC ULLCA. Both LLC members and the
public that interacts with them will benefit from knowing the business is secure in
its dealings and that courts will consistently interpret those dealings.
IV. DID THE ACTION MEET DERIVATIVE REQUIREMENTS?
A second component of the opinion that deserves analysis is the derivative
action element. The statute provides members may maintain direct actions to
enforce the member's rights under the operating agreement, rights under the statute,
and "rights that otherwise protect the interests of the member, including rights and
interests arising independently of the member's relationship to the company."' 34 An
accounting action is considered a remedy between members' and is therefore
normally brought directly. Like the corporation and limited partnership statutes,
36
the SC ULLCA allows claims to be brought against an LLC derivatively.'
132. See Halbersberg v. Berry, 302 S.C. 97, 102-03,394 S.E.2d 7, 10-11 (Ct. App. 1990).
133. Act of May 20, 1996, 1996 S.C. Acts 2075.
134. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-410 (2006).
135. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 82, § 10:4, at 10-16 to -17 ("The accounting, which
reviews and settles all financial matters in a single proceeding, is the primary mechanism for resolving
claims among partners.").
136. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-400 (2006) ("Derivative suits maybe maintained on behalf of
South Carolina corporations in federal and state court in accordance with the applicable rules of civil
procedure." (emphasis added)) (referencing Rule 23, SCRCP (2004)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-42-1810
(2006) ("A limited partner may bring an action in the right of a limited partnership to recover a
judgment in its favor if general partners with authority to do so have refused to bring the action or if
an effort to cause those general partners to bring the action is not likely to succeed." (emphasis added)).
The Uniform Partnership Act includes no comparable provision. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-41-10 to
-1330 (2006).
137. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-1101 (2006) ("A member of a limited liability company may
maintain an action in the right of the company if the members or managers having authority to do so
have refused to commence the action or an effort to cause those members or managers to commence
the action is not likely to succeed." (emphasis added)).
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A. Propriety of Derivative Actions in Closely Held Companies
1. Trend Toward Direct Actions
Commentators agree a derivative action may be improper for closely held
companies. "Because of the difficulty in determining if a suit must be brought as
a direct or a derivative action, an increasing number of courts are abandoning the
distinction between a derivative and a direct action because the only interested
parties are the two sets of shareholders."'3 8 Some courts have formulated a "close
corporation exception" to allow derivative-type actions to be brought as direct
actions. 9 When appropriate, a derivative action "facilitates fiduciary breach
claims against managers who otherwise would control the firm's decision to sue."14
Derivative actions in a closely held LLC are generally inappropriate "[b]ecause each
member of a decentralized firm probably has some power to sue, [so] members do
not need the extraordinary derivative remedy in order to litigate the LLC's claim."'41
2. Was the Action in Historic Charleston Holdings Direct or Derivative?
In Historic Charleston Holdings, HCH and Coker brought the action both
directly and derivatively.'42 The court of appeals acknowledged the claims in part
were brought derivatively.'43 Mallon contested whether the action met the
derivative requirements, but the court said Mallon did not preserve the issue of
meeting derivative requirements for review on appeal." Because the court did not
directly address the issue, the question is left open whether the case met derivative
requirements.
Because the court did not distinguish between the direct and derivative action,
South Carolina could be following the close corporation exception used in other
jurisdictions. On occasion, other courts have not bothered to note the distinction
138. Richards v. Bryan, 879 P.2d 638, 647 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).
139. Peter H. Donaldson, Breathing Life into Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West
Development, Inc.: Utah 's Close Corporation Exception to the Derivative Lawsuit Requirement and
the Case for Strong Fiduciary Duties in Close Corporations, 2002 UTAH L. REv. 519, 519 n.3 (citing
Richards v. Bryan, 879 P.2d at 647-48); see also BURKHARD, supra note 50, § 5.07, at 104-05 (stating
"the growing acceptance of allowing shareholders of close corporations to freely bring direct
suits... will likely have an impact on litigation by limited liability company members").
140. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 82, § 10:3, at 10-7.
141. Id. § 10:3, at 10-9.
142. Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 365 S.C. 524, 531,617 S.E.2d 388, 391 (Ct.
App. 2005) ("HCH, individually and in a derivative capacity as a member of Dixie Holdings, brought
suit against Mallon, Dixie Holdings, and Dixie Developers .... ").
143. Id. at 532, 617 S.E.2d at 392 ("In the underlying action, HCH sued in a derivative capacity
for an accounting and injunctive relief. Actions for an accounting, for an injunction, and shareholder
derivative actions are all actions in equity.").
144. Id. at 539,617 S.E.2d at 396 ("[W]e find Mallon's argument that HCH's action did not meet
the requirements for a derivative action not preserved for our review.").
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when treating derivative actions as direct. 145 Courts circumvent the policy behind
the derivative requirements by failing to make that distinction. South Carolina Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) contains the same language as Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.1 for derivative actions." The language of the LLC derivative
requirements is slightly different and therefore not based directly on South Carolina
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), but the policy reasons for derivative actions
should still apply. Plaintiffs in derivative actions must show they made a demand
and that they adequately represent the other shareholders.'47 Because litigation is
costly to a business, these requirements ensure that a single shareholder or member
cannot force a business into court without first giving the management a chance to
address the party's concern. As stated by the court of appeals with respect to a
corporation:
[I]t is manifest that to allow a single stockholder, or one or more
of them, to force a corporation or its managing agents into a
litigation, which the majority of the body or its officers may think
unwise or unnecessary, would place it in the power of a single
stockholder who may be dissatisfied with the management of the
business of the corporation to involve the corporation in expensive
litigation, which might be destructive to the interests of such
corporation, and would permit a single discontented stockholder
to force the majority, who have the right to control, to adopt his
views of policy, or incur the expense and hazards of a lawsuit.'4
The Carolina First court discussed the role of corporate management in deciding
whether to sue,' 49 which is a different situation from a two-member LLC. While
there was no real issue in Historic Charleston Holdings because there was no
separate management from the members, the impact of the litigation on the LLC's
resources was more severe because the LLC was closely held and had few assets.
Therefore, addressing the derivative action requirements is important in the context
of closely held companies that can scarcely afford to deal with disgruntled
members' derivative suits.
The distinction between direct and derivative actions is also important because
"[the procedural requirements are different, as are the available remedies. In
145. James R. Burkhard, LLC Member and Limited Partner Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims:
Direct or Derivative Actions?, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 19, 30 (2003).
146. Carolina First Corp. v. Whittle, 343 S.C. 176,185 n.5, 539 S.E.2d 402, 407 n.5 (Ct. App.
2000).
147. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-1101 to -1103 (2006).
148. Carolina First Corp., 343 S.C. at 186 n.6, 539 S.E.2d at 408 n.6 (emphasis added) (quoting
Latimer v. Richmond & D.R. Co., 39 S.C. 44, 53-54, 17 S.E. 258, 261 (1893)).
149. Id. at 187, 539 S.E.2d at 408.
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addition, the remedies benefit different parties." 5 ' In Historic Charleston Holdings,
the court did not discuss the derivative action requirements, which the plaintiffs
likely could not have met. Meeting the derivative requirements is important
because of the method in which the court will award a remedy. Although the case
was remanded for an accounting, the court upheld the master's award of attorney's
fees based on the derivative action component of the LLC statute.'51 The court
seems to have treated the action as one brought derivatively but did not analyze the
derivative requirements.
B. Meeting the Statutory Derivative Action Requirements
1. Membership and Demand
The LLC statute lists three requirements a plaintiff must meet to bring a
derivative action. The first requirement, which is met without discussion here, is
that the plaintiff must be a member of the LLC when the action is commenced. 52
The second requirement has two prongs. First, the "members or managers having
the authority to [bring an action] have refused to commence the action," and,
second, "an effort to cause those members or managers to commence the action is
not likely to succeed."'5 3 The second requirement is equivalent to the demand
requirement for corporate derivative actions; however, the corporate requirement
is broader to allow demand for any type of corrective action (i.e., include suggestion
in proxy vote, adopt internal procedure, or specifically request other actions) to
address the shareholder's concern, while the LLC demand requirement is limited
to demanding a legal action.54 Dixie Holdings' operating agreement did not restrict
either member's ability to bring an action, and each had "votes equal to his
Membership Percentage in the Company."' '55 Because they each had only fifty
150. Daniel S. Kleinberger & Imanta Bergmanis, Direct vs. Derivative, or "What's a Lawsuit
Between Friends in an 'Incorporated Partnership? "', 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1203, 1204 (1996)
(footnotes omitted).
151. Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 365 S.C. 524,531, 617 S.E.2d 388, 391-92,
397 (Ct. App. 2005).
152. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-1102 (2006). Coker was a member of Dixie Holdings as of the
December 1999 agreement and there is no indication in the opinion that Coker's status changed with
respect to Dixie Holdings. Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.C. at 530, 617 S.E.2d at 391.
153. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-1101 (2006).
154. The LLC statute refers to "the action" in relation to the "action in the right of the company."
S.C. CODEANN. § 33-44-1101 (2006). However, the corporations statute refers to South Carolina Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1). See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-400 (2006). The rule refers to "efforts, if any,
made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors." Rule 23(b)(1), SCRCP.
Therefore, derivative actions under the corporations statute brought pursuant to SCRCP 23(b)(1)
require a broader type of demand by the plaintiff than the LLC statute.
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percent of the membership interest," 6 and the operating agreement required a
majority to act,5 7 both members had to consent to a proposed derivative action.
Although Coker requested that Mallon relinquish the funds in the separate account,
the court's description of the situation shows Coker brought the action when Mallon
did not give up the funds. 5 Therefore, under the first prong, if the members with
authority refused to bring an action, Mallon-who had authority-had no
opportunity to give consent to bring an action.
The problem with this requirement as applied to closely held LLCs is that "the
same managers and members who were involved in the questioned transaction
probably would be called onto make the decision whether to sue." 59 Mallon would
likely never give consent because he would effectively be giving consent to sue
himself. However, the court could find that such a situation would meet the second
prong when an effort to get the members with authority to bring an action is
unlikely to succeed. "The purpose of pre-suit demand is to assure that the
stockholder affords the corporation the opportunity to address an alleged wrong
without litigation, to decide whether to invest the resources of the corporation in
litigation, and to control any litigation which does occur. ' In a two-member LLC
when one of the members is a defendant, the pre-suit demand requirement is
ineffectual.
Another concern related to the demand requirement is that the December 1999
operating agreement amendment required the parties to arbitrate if they could not
resolve their differences related to Mallon's payment for work on Dixie Holdings'
properties."' The court did not mention any effort by HCH or Coker to initiate
arbitration before bringing their complaint, nor did the court note any effort by
Mallon to initiate arbitration. The lack of evidence of an attempt to arbitrate, the
preferred remedy per the operating agreement amendment, demonstrates the
plaintiffs failed to make a full effort to demand an action.
2. Particularity
The third requirement for LLC derivative actions directly relates to the second
because it requires that "the complaint must set forth with particularity the effort of
156. Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.C. at 529-30 n.1, 617 S.E.2d at 390-91 n.l (noting
the operating agreement stated that Mallon and HCH each had 49.5% interests and Storen 1%, and that
Mallon and HCH bought Storen's share when Storen dissociated, leaving each party with a 50%
interest).
157. Operating Agreement of Dixie Holdings, LLC, supra note 155.
158. Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.C. at 530-31,617 S.E.2d at 391.
159. 1 RIBSTEIN& KEATINGE, supra note 82, §10:8, at 10-31.
160. Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 773 (Del. 1990), quoted in Carolina First Corp. v.
Whittle, 343 S.C. 176, 188, 539 S.E.2d 402, 409 (Ct. App. 2000).
161. Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.C. at 530, 617 S.E.2dat391 ("The agreement provided
for an audit of Dixie Holdings and stated if the members could not resolve their differences, then an
arbitrator would be appointed by agreement of the parties.").
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the plaintiff to secure initiation of the action by a member or manager or the reasons
for not making the effort."'' 62 The statute thus required HCH to describe its efforts
to obtain Mallon's approval of a legal action or explain why it did not try. The
court did not discuss whether HCH's complaint pled the details with particularity.
This requirement also seems difficult to meet if the plaintiffs efforts to secure
initiation of an action by the members were not sufficient. Because the court did
not address whether the complaint met the requirement, the court could not have
determined whether the action qualified as a derivative suit.
C. Impact of Derivative or Direct Action
Whether the action is derivative affects the method of awarding damages and
fees.'63 The master ordered that HCH receive attorney's fees and costs based on
section 33-44-1104,)64 which provides the requirements for an LLC derivative
action. 65 The attorney's fees were $15,643.60.166 The master awarded half of the
funds to HCH, an award the court of appeals reversed. 67 However, if the master
treated the action as derivative, the statute requires the plaintiff to turn over the
remaining award to the LLC. Thus, HCH, which was suing on behalf of Dixie
Holdings, would have to return its awarded half to Dixie Holdings. Dixie Holdings
would receive the remaining disputed assets under the master's order and find itself
in the same position as before the action. However, because HCH must pay
'attorney fees of$15,643.60, Dixie Holdings would actually receive only $5,279.05
from HCH, leaving Dixie Holdings with $26,201.70. When the funds are
distributed per the operating agreement, each member would get $13,100.85
because they would split the remaining assets in half. Instead of splitting $41,845.30
and receiving approximately $21,000 each, the parties now have only the
$26,201.70 to split. Both HCH and Mallon would lose money. Presumably the
parties would retain counsel throughout the remanded accounting process and spend
additional funds to resolve the distribution in court:
By upholding the attorney's fees awarded under section 33-44-1104 but
remanding the case for an accounting, the court confused which parties should
benefit from the action and also confused the potential result. A derivative action
benefits the LLC because it is brought to enforce the LLC's rights. An accounting
action settles disputes among members. The operating agreement in Historic
162. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-1103 (2006).
163. See Kleinberger & Bergmanis, supra note 147, at 1204.
164. Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.C. at 532, 617 S.E.2d at 392.
165. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-1104 states that in a successful derivation action, "the court may
award the plaintiff reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, and shall direct the
plaintiff to remit to the limited liability company the remainder of the proceeds received." S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-44-1104 (2006).
166. Historic Charleston Holdings, 365 S.C. at 540, 617 S.E.2d at 396.
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Charleston Holdings allowed indemnification of a member except in derivative
actions. 1S Neither party would be able recover indemnification from the LLC in the
derivative action, but the parties could both seek indemnification for expenses under
the accounting action between the members. Because the court allowed HCH's
attorney's fees as part of the derivative claim, the fees were no longer available for
indemnification. However, Mallon's attorney's fees were not designated as the
result of a derivative claim, and he could possibly seek indemnification for those
from the LLC.
V. CONCLUSION
As LLCs become more popular with South Carolina entrepreneurs and existing
LLCs mature, courts will face an increasing number of legal actions to resolve
disputes. At the same time, South Carolina's economy is expanding, and even more
LLCs will be created as the economy grows, giving rise to more LLC litigation. To
avoid problems, the courts should resolve issues in a manner that helps parties avoid
litigation while decreasing the cost of doing business. One important issue is when
an accounting remedy is efficient and appropriate, given the varying size of
businesses and the differing complexities of their financial arrangements. Another
important issue is when suits meet the requirements for a derivative action, which
can force businesses into court without giving them a chance to address the issue
themselves. The derivative action, if abused, can also increase the cost of doing
business. Courts can easily curb abuse by holding plaintiffs to the statutory
requirements on which derivative suits are based. In Historic Charleston Holdings,
the accounting remedy was unnecessary and the plaintiffs likely did not meet the
derivative requirements. If South Carolina is to encourage responsible business,
businesspeople must be held to the terms of the agreements they enter, which in this
case would have meant an order that the funds be distributed pursuant to the
operating agreement. The South Carolina Court of Appeals appears to have skirted
the issues of responsibility, which sets an unfortunate example for future LLC
actions.
Carmen Harper Thomas
168. Operating Agreement of Dixie Holdings, LLC, supra note 155, at Section 6.3 ("In any
threatened, pending, or completed action, suit or proceeding to which any Member was or is a party or
is threatened to be made a party by reason of the fact that he is or was a Member of the Company (other
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